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Introduction:	   At	   the	   centenary	   of	   research	   on	   anosognosia,	   the	   time	   seems	   ripe	   to	  
supplement	   work	   in	   anosognosic	   patients	   with	   empirical	   studies	   on	   nosognosia	   in	  
healthy	  subjects.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  adopted	  a	  signal	  detection	  framework	  to	  investigate	  
the	  lateralized	  recognition	  of	  illness	  words	  –	  an	  operational	  measure	  of	  nosognosia	  –	  in	  
healthy	   participants.	   As	   positively	   biased	   reports	   about	   one’s	   current	   health	   status	  
(anosognosia)	   and	   future	   health	   status	   (unrealistic	   optimism)	   have	   both	   been	  
associated	   with	   deficient	   right	   hemispheric	   functioning,	   and	   conversely	   with	  
undisturbed	   left	   hemispheric	   functioning,	   we	   hypothesised	   that	   more	   optimistic	  
participants	   would	   adopt	   a	  more	   conservative	   response	   criterion,	   and/or	   display	   less	  
sensitivity,	   when	   identifying	   illnesses	   in	   our	   nosognosia	   task;	   especially	   harmful	  
illnesses	  presented	  to	  the	  left	  hemisphere	  via	  	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  
	  
Material	   and	   methods:	   Thirty-­‐two	   healthy	   right-­‐handed	   men	   estimated	   their	   own	  
relative	  risk	  of	  contracting	  a	  series	  of	  illnesses	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  then	  completed	  a	  novel	  
computer	  task	  assessing	  their	  recognition	  of	  illness	  names	  presented	  to	  the	  left	  or	  right	  
visual	  field.	  To	  check	  that	  effects	  were	  specific	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  illness	  (rather	  than	  
reflecting	   recognition	   of	   lexical	   items	   per	   se),	   we	   also	   administered	   a	   standard	  
lateralized	  lexical	  decision	  task.	  
	  
Results:	  Highly	   optimistic	   participants	   tended	   to	   be	   more	   conservative	   in	   detecting	  
illnesses,	   especially	   harmful	   illnesses	   presented	   to	   the	   right	   visual	   field.	   Contrary	   to	  
expectation,	  they	  were	  also	  more	  sensitive	  to	  illness	  names	  in	  this	  half-­‐field.	  
	  
Conclusions:	  We	  suggest	   that,	   in	  evolutionary	   terms,	  unrealistic	  optimism	  may	  be	  an	  
adaptive	   trait	   that	   combines	   a	   high	   perceptual	   sensitivity	   to	   threat	   with	   a	   high	  
threshold	  for	  acknowledging	  its	  presence.	  The	  signal	  detection	  approach	  to	  nosognosia	  
developed	   here	  may	   open	   up	   new	   avenues	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   anosognosia	   in	  
neurological	  patients.	  
	  
Key	   index	   words/phrases:	   Anosognosia;	   Nosognosia;	   Unrealistic	   optimism;	   Illness	  
Recognition;	  Signal	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  Theory.	  






Just	   as	   phonagnosia	   denotes	   deficient	   voice	   recognition	   and	   prosopagnosia	   denotes	  
deficient	   face	  recognition,	  anosognosia	  denotes	  an	   impairment	   in	  disease	   recognition.	  
More	   specifically,	   anosognosic	   patients	   fail	   to	   recognize	   or	   acknowledge	   that	   they	  
themselves	   are	   ill.	   A	   century	   of	   work	   on	   anosognosia	   (Babinski,	   1914),	   however,	   has	  
failed	  to	  illuminate	  the	  normal	  function	  that	  is	  disrupted	  in	  anosognosic	  patients.	  While	  
work	  in	  patients	  with	  prosopagnosia	  has	  been	  continuously	  inspired	  by	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  
rich	   body	   of	   research	   into	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   normal	   face	   recognition,	   anosognosia	  
research	   has	   not	   been	   comparably	   informed	   by	   studies	   on	   the	   process	   of	   disease	  
recognition	   in	   the	   healthy	   brain.	   In	   the	   present	   paper	   we	   begin	   to	   redress	   this	  
imbalance,	  by	  adopting	  a	  signal	  detection	  framework	  to	  investigate	  the	  recognition	  of	  
illness	   –	   ‘nosognosia’	   -­‐	   in	   healthy	   participants.	   In	   particular,	   we	   investigate	   the	  
lateralized	   recognition	   of	   illness	  words,	   and	   its	   association	   with	   unrealistic	   optimism	  
concerning	  future	  illness.	  
	  
Unrealistic	   optimism	   refers	   to	   the	   robust	   and	   widespread	   tendency	   of	   healthy	  
individuals	  to	  underestimate	  –	  or	  at	  least	  to	  understate	  (see	  below)	  -­‐	  their	  likelihood	  of	  
experiencing	   future	   misfortune,	   including	   future	   illness	   or	   disease	   (Weinstein,	   1980,	  
1989;	  Sharot,	  2011).	  For	  example,	  people	  typically	  report	  their	  own	  risks	  of	  contracting	  
food	  poisoning	  or	  pneumonia	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  the	  risks	  of	  their	  peers	  (Weinstein,	  1987).	  
Anosognosia	   and	   unrealistic	   optimism	   share	   a	   number	   of	   intriguing	   links.	   First,	   they	  
both	  appear	  to	  involve	  deficient	  updating	  of	  beliefs	  in	  response	  to	  evidence.	  Vocat	  et	  al.	  
(2013)	  recently	  found	  that	  compared	  to	  control	  participants	  (both	  healthy	  controls	  and	  
‘nosognosics’,	   i.e.,	   hemiplegic	   patients	   without	   anosognosia),	   anosognosic	   patients	  
tended	   to	   stick	   to	   their	   former	   ‘false’	   beliefs	   about	   the	   answer	   to	   a	   riddle	   instead	   of	  
modifying	   them	   in	   light	  of	  new	  evidence.	  Meanwhile,	   recent	  neuroscientific	  work	  has	  
indicated	   that	   unrealistic	   optimism	   is	   sustained	   by	   systematically	   biased	   belief	  
updating,	  such	  that	  healthy	  individuals	  are	  relatively	  disinclined	  to	  revise	  their	  beliefs	  in	  
response	  to	  undesirable	  information	  (Sharot	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Eil	  &	  Rao,	  2012).	  
	  
Second,	   anosognosia	   and	   unrealistic	   optimism	   have	   been	   independently	   associated	  
with	   damaged	  or	   deficient	   right	   hemispheric	   functioning,	   and	   conversely	  with	   intact,	  
undisturbed	  left	  hemispheric	  functioning.	  For	  example,	  Berti	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  that	  the	  
pars	  opercularis	  of	  the	  right	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  (IFG)	  was	  damaged	  in	  15	  of	  17	  patients	  
with	   anosognosia	   for	   left	   hemiplegia.	   Sharot	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   found	   that	   unrealistic	  
optimism	   is	   associated	  with	   deficient	   coding	   of	   undesirable	   information	   in	   this	   brain	  
region.	   In	  a	  subsequent	  study,	  Sharot	  et	  al.	   (2012)	  attenuated	  unrealistic	  optimism	  by	  
disrupting	   the	   function	   of	   the	   left	   (but	   not	   right)	   IFG	   using	   transcranial	   magnetic	  
stimulation,	   suggesting	   that	   left-­‐hemispheric	   structures	   play	   a	   role	   in	   inhibiting	   the	  





Third,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	  both	  anosognosia	   (Cappa	  et	  al.,	   1987;	  Rode	  et	  al.,	   1992;	  
Ramachandran,	  1995)	  and	  unrealistic	  optimism	  (McKay	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  can	  be	  temporarily	  
attenuated	  by	  vestibular	  stimulation,	  particularly	  by	  irrigation	  of	  the	  left	  (but	  not	  right)	  
ear	   with	   cold	   water,	   a	   procedure	   known	   to	   activate	   the	   right	   inferior	   frontal	   region	  
(Lobel	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Fasold	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  
	  
Given	   the	   above	   links	   between	   unrealistic	   optimism	   and	   anosognosia,	   we	   wondered	  
whether	   unrealistic	   optimism	  would	   predict	   healthy	   participants’	   performance	   on	   an	  
illness	   recognition	   (nosognosia)	   task.	  We	  were	  unsure,	   however,	  whether	   to	   expect	   a	  
connection	   between	   unrealistic	   optimism	   and	   sensitivity	   on	   the	   task,	   or	   between	  
unrealistic	   optimism	   and	   response	   bias.	   This	   distinction	   cuts	   to	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   long-­‐
standing	   debate	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   anosognosia	   (e.g.,	   see	   Ramachandran,	   1995;	  
Nardone,	   Ward,	   Fotopoulou	   &	   Turnbull,	   2007).	   Are	   anosognosic	   patients	   truly	  
insensitive	  to	  their	  disability,	  or	  are	  they	  aware	  of	  this	  at	  some	  level	  but	  disinclined	  to	  
acknowledge	  it	  (whether	  to	  themselves	  or	  to	  others)?	  If	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  may	  be	  
that	  anosognosic	  patients	  are	  best	  characterized	  as	  displaying	  a	  response	  bias:	  perhaps	  
due	  to	  the	  emotional	  or	  perceived	  social	  cost	  of	  acknowledging	  their	  disability,	  they	  set	  
an	   abnormally	   high	   threshold	   for	   reporting	   awareness	   of	   it.	   Likewise,	   healthy	  
participants	  may	  have	  genuinely	  distorted	  beliefs	  about	  their	  prospects	  of	  contracting	  
illnesses	   in	   the	   future	   (resulting	   in	   a	   reduction	   in	   sensitivity),	   or	   they	  may	   be	   biased	  
against	   signaling	   their	   accurate	   beliefs	   to	   others	   or	   to	   themselves	   (Mijović-­‐Prelec	   &	  
Prelec,	  2010).	  
	  
To	  explore	   these	  possibilities,	  we	  developed	  a	  novel	  computer	   task	   to	   investigate	   the	  
lateralized	  recognition	  of	  illness	  words.	  We	  predicted	  that	  more	  optimistic	  participants	  
would	  adopt	  a	  more	   conservative	   response	  bias	  when	  detecting	   illnesses	   in	   this	   task,	  
and/or	  that	  they	  would	  display	  less	  sensitivity.	  We	  reasoned	  that	  any	  such	  effects	  would	  
be	   especially	   pronounced	   for	   more	   harmful	   illnesses,	   which	   are	   more	   personally	  
consequential.	  Moreover,	   in	   light	  of	   the	   connection	  between	  normal	   left	   hemispheric	  
functioning	   and	   unrealistic	   optimism	   (Sharot	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   we	   predicted	   that	  
participants	   (especially	   optimistic	   participants)	   would	   respond	   more	   conservatively,	  
and/or	   display	   less	   sensitivity,	   when	   illnesses	   were	   presented	   in	   the	   right	   visual	   field	  
(and	  thus	  to	  the	   left	  hemisphere).	  Again,	  we	  expected	  that	  any	  such	  effects	  would	  be	  
especially	  pronounced	  for	  more	  harmful	  illnesses.	  To	  check	  that	  effects	  were	  specific	  to	  
the	  recognition	  of	  illness	  (rather	  than	  reflecting	  recognition	  of	  lexical	  items	  per	  se),	  we	  
also	  administered	  a	  standard	  lateralized	  lexical	  decision	  task.	  
	  
2.	  Material	  and	  methods	  
	  
2.1	  Participants	  
Participants	   were	   32	   right-­‐handed	   men	   (mean	   age	   (SD)	   =	   26.5	   years	   (2.1	   years))	  
recruited	  via	  convenience	  sampling.	  All	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected	   to	  normal	  vision	  and	  
none	  had	   taken	  any	  medication	   for	   at	   least	   a	  week	  prior	   to	   testing.	  Handedness	  was	  




Loetscher	   &	   Grimshaw,	   2013).	   A	   negative	   history	   of	   neuropsychiatrically	   relevant	  
disorders	   (e.g.,	   learning	   difficulties,	   substance	   abuse)	   was	   ascertained	   via	   a	   brief	  
interview	  modeled	  after	  Campbell	  (2000).	  Written	  informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  from	  
all	  participants	  before	  testing	  began.	  
	  
2.2	  Tasks	  and	  procedure	  
2.2.1	   Optimism	   measure:	   Participants	   were	   asked	   to	   estimate	   their	   personal	   risk,	  
relative	  to	  that	  of	  their	  peers	  (same	  age,	  sex	  and	  nationality),	  of	  contracting	  a	  series	  of	  
16	  illnesses.	  We	  used	  a	  six	  point	  Likert-­‐type	  risk	  rating	  scale	  ranging	  from	  -­‐3	  (‘very	  much	  
smaller’)	  to	  +3	  (‘very	  much	  higher’).	  
	  
Our	  procedure	  for	  selecting	  the	  16	  illnesses	  used	  in	  this	  study	  was	  as	  follows:	  
• Flammer,	   Reisbeck	   and	   Stadler	   (1985)	   published	   a	   list	   of	   142	   illnesses	  
spontaneously	  named	  by	  286	  Swiss	   students	   (age	   range	   16-­‐30	   years)	   in	   a	   one	  
minute	  category	  fluency	  task	  (category:	  illnesses	  and	  diseases).	  	  
• From	  this	  list	  of	  142	  illnesses,	  we	  pooled	  all	  illness	  names	  with	  a	  length	  of	  four	  to	  
seven	   letters,	   and	   added	   “AIDS”	   and	   “EBOLA”	   due	   to	   their	   publicity	   in	   the	  
intervening	  period.	  This	  resulted	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  52	  illnesses.	  	  
• We	  then	  obtained	  ratings	  of	  the	  harmfulness	  of	  these	  52	  illnesses	  (ratings	  were	  
made	  on	  a	   six	  point	   scale	  by	  56	   independent	   raters).	  From	  this	  pool	  of	  52,	  we	  
subsequently	   chose	   the	   eight	   illnesses	   judged	   least	   harmful	   (AKNE	   =	   acne;	  
ANGINA;	   EKZEM	  =	   eczema;	   FIEBER	   =	   fever;	   GRIPPE	   =	   flu;	   HUSTEN	   =	   cough;	  
KARIES	  =	   tooth	  decay;	  MASERN	  =	  measles;	  mean	  harmfulness	   rating	  =	  1.960,	  
SD	   =	   0.300)	   and	   the	   eight	   illnesses	   judged	   most	   harmful1	   (AIDS;	   CHOLERA;	  
EBOLA	  =	  ebola	  virus;	  EMBOLIE=	  embolism;	  INFARKT=	  infarct;	  LEPRA	  =	  leprosy;	  
PEST	   =	   plague;	   TUMOR;	   mean	   harmfulness	   rating	   =	   5.311,	   SD	   =	   0.317).	   The	  
harmfulness	   ratings	   of	   the	   latter	   eight	   illnesses	  were	   significantly	   higher	   than	  
those	  of	  the	  former	  eight	  (t14	  =	  21.4,	  p	  <	  .0001),	  but	  the	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ	  
in	   terms	  of	  word	   length,	  Mannheim	  wordform	  frequency	  or	  Mannheim	   lemma	  
frequency	   (all	   ps	   >	   .05).	   The	   latter	   lexical	   variables	   were	   obtained	   from	   the	  
WebCelex	  site	  (Max	  Planck	  Institute	  for	  Psycholinguistics,	  2001).	  
	  
2.2.2	   Nosognosia	   task:	   The	   task	   comprised	   64	   trials.	   On	   each	   trial	   two	   words	   were	  
simultaneously	  presented	  onscreen	  for	  150ms,	  one	  to	  the	  left	  and	  one	  to	  the	  right	  of	  a	  
central	   fixation	   cross.	   Stimulus	   eccentricities	   varied	   between	   two	   and	   six	   degrees	   of	  
visual	   angle	   horizontally.	   On	   non-­‐target	   trials	   the	   two	   words	   were	   (different)	   animal	  
names,	  whereas	  on	  target	  trials	  one	  of	  the	  words	  referred	  to	  an	  animal	  and	  the	  other	  to	  
an	  illness.	  Participants	  were	  required	  to	  press	  a	  left-­‐sided	  response	  key	  for	  an	  illness	  in	  
the	  left	  visual	  field,	  a	  right-­‐sided	  key	  for	  an	  illness	  in	  the	  right	  visual	  field,	  and	  the	  space	  
bar	  for	  (non-­‐target)	  trials	  that	  did	  not	  contain	  any	  illness	  names.	  
	  
                                                
1	  Excluding	  the	  item	  KREBS	  (cancer),	  which	  was	  rated	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  harmful	  illnesses	  but	  which	  was	  




The	  16	  illness	  names	  from	  the	  optimism	  measure	  (eight	  harmful,	  eight	  harmless)	  were	  
used	  as	  target	  stimuli	  in	  this	  task.	  Forty-­‐eight	  animal	  names	  (word	  length	  between	  four	  
and	  seven	  letters)	  were	  used	  as	  non-­‐targets.	  These	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  sources	  listed	  
in	   Flammer	   et	   al.	   (1985)	   and	   thus	   corresponded	   to	   those	   animals	   most	   frequently	  
named	  in	  category	  fluency	  tasks	  by	  independent	  subject	  groups.	  
	  
Each	  participant	  completed	  32	  non-­‐target	  trials	  and	  32	  target	  trials.	  The	  non-­‐target	  trials	  
comprised	   two	  presentations	   each	   of	   16	   different	   animal-­‐animal	   pairs	   (each	   pair	  was	  
presented	  once	  as	  animal	  A	   /	   animal	  B	  and	  once	  as	  animal	  B	   /	   animal	  A;	   the	   items	   in	  
each	  pair	  were	  always	  coupled	  together).	  The	  target	  trials	  comprised	  two	  presentations	  
each	  of	  16	  different	  animal-­‐illness	  pairs	  (each	  pair	  was	  presented	  once	  as	  animal	  /	  illness	  
and	   once	   as	   illness	   /	   animal;	   again,	   the	   items	   in	   each	   pair	   were	   always	   coupled	  
together).	  Each	  word	  (whether	  animal	  or	  illness)	  was	  thus	  presented	  twice,	  once	  to	  the	  
left	  and	  once	  to	  the	  right	  of	  fixation.	  The	  sequence	  of	  64	  unique	  trials	  was	  randomized	  
individually	  for	  each	  participant.	  
	  
2.2.3	   Lexical	   decision	   task:	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   nosognosia	   task,	   our	   participants	   also	  
completed	   a	   lexical	   decision	   analogue	   of	   this	   task.	   All	   parameters	   were	   as	   for	   the	  
nosognosia	   task,	   except	   that	   i)	   non-­‐target	   trials	   involved	   the	   presentation	   of	   two	  
(different)	   non-­‐words	   and	   target	   trials	   involved	   the	   presentation	   of	   a	   non-­‐word	  
alongside	   a	   real	   word;	   ii)	   the	   target	   stimuli	   (real	   words)	   were	   not	   split	   into	   two	  
categories	   (cf.	   the	   nosognosia	   task	   where	   target	   stimuli	   were	   either	   harmless	   or	  
harmful	   illnesses);	   and	   iii)	   stimuli	   always	   consisted	   of	   four	   letters,	   whereas	   in	   the	  
nosognosia	  task	  they	  varied	  between	  four	  and	  seven	  letters.	  
	  
The	  above	  tasks	  were	  administered	  in	  the	  following	  invariant	  order:	  optimism	  measure,	  




3.1	  Computation	  of	  key	  variables	  
3.1.1	   Optimism:	   We	   performed	   an	   initial	   analysis	   to	   establish	   evidence	   of	   unrealistic	  
optimism	  in	  our	  sample.2	  The	  average	  risk	  estimate	  (mean	  of	  16	  ratings)	  was	  calculated	  
for	  each	  participant	  and	  reversed	  (multiplied	  by	  -­‐1)	  to	  produce	  an	  optimism	  score	  with	  
higher	  scores	  indicative	  of	  greater	  optimism.	  We	  used	  a	  one-­‐sample	  t	  test	  to	  compare	  
the	  average	  optimism	  score	  for	  our	  32	  participants	  to	  the	  chance	  value	  of	  zero.	  Overall,	  
our	   participants	   were	   unrealistically	   optimistic	   about	   their	   chances	   of	   contracting	  
illnesses	   (Mean	   risk	   estimate	   =	   0.65,	   SD	   =	   0.77;	   t31	   =	   4.79,	   p	   <	   .001,	   two-­‐tailed).	   For	  
factorial	   analyses	  we	   used	   a	  median	   split	   to	   convert	   the	   continuous	   optimism	   scores	  
into	  a	  categorical	  between-­‐participants	  factor	  (optimism:	  low,	  high).	  For	  these	  analyses	  
                                                
2	  Our	  estimation	  method	  can	  only	  be	  used	  to	  detect	  unrealistic	  optimism	  at	  group	  level.	  Many	  individuals	  
will,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  be	  less	  at	  risk	  of	  contracting	  certain	  illnesses	  than	  others,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  




three	   participants	   with	   an	   optimism	   score	   at	   the	   median	   (=0.75)	   were	   excluded,	  
reducing	  the	  sample	  size	  to	  n=29	  (low	  optimism	  n=15;	  high	  optimism	  n=14).	  
	  
3.1.2	   Bias:	   As	   a	   metric	   of	   bias	   we	   computed	   C,	   the	   criterion	   score,	   a	   measure	   of	   a	  
respondent’s	  willingness	   to	   report	   that	   the	   target	   signal	   (an	   illness	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	  
nosognosia	  task,	  a	  real	  word	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	   lexical	  decision	  task)	  was	  present.	  The	  
formula	  for	  C	   is	  -­‐0.5*(z(FA)	  +	  z(H)),	  where	  z(FA)	   is	  the	  z-­‐transformed	  False	  Alarm	  rate	  
and	  z(H)	  the	  z-­‐transformed	  Hit	  rate.	  Positive	  values	  of	  C	  denote	  a	  conservative	  response	  
bias,	  whereas	  negative	  values	  denote	  a	  liberal	  response	  bias.	  
	  
3.1.3	  Sensitivity:	  We	  computed	  d'	  (‘d-­‐prime’),	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  sensitivity	  metric	  in	  
signal	   detection	   theory.	   The	   formula	   for	  d'	   is	   z(FA)	   -­‐	   z(H).	   Higher	   values	   of	  d'	   reflect	  
greater	  sensitivity.	  
	  
3.2	  Bias	  Analyses	  
To	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  optimism	  and	  bias	  in	  illness	  recognition	  (taking	  
into	   account	   illness	   harmfulness	   and	   visual	   field	   of	   presentation),	   we	   performed	   a	   2	  
(visual	   field:	   left,	   right;	   within-­‐subjects)	   x	   2	   (harmfulness:	   harmless,	   harmful;	   within-­‐
subjects)	  x	  2	  (optimism:	  low,	  high;	  between-­‐subjects)	  mixed-­‐design	  analysis	  of	  variance	  
(ANOVA)	   on	   the	   bias	   scores	   (C)	   in	   the	   nosognosia	   task.	   This	   analysis	   revealed	   a	  
significant	  main	   effect	   of	   harmfulness	   (F1,27	   =	   9.70,	  p	   =	   .004,	   ηp2	   =	   .264),	   such	   that	   a	  
more	   liberal	   response	   criterion	  was	   adopted	   for	   harmful	   illnesses	   (mean	  C	   (SE)	   =	   .25	  
(.12))	  than	  harmless	  illnesses	  (.39	  (.13)).3	  There	  were	  no	  other	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  
interactions	  (all	  ps	  >	  .139).	  
	  
As	   the	   above	   factorial	   analysis	   was	   conducted	   using	   a	  median	   split	   of	   the	   optimism	  
variable,	  we	  may	  have	  lost	  considerable	  statistical	  power	  (Cohen,	  1983).	  We	  therefore	  
ran	   some	   follow-­‐up	   correlational	   analyses,	   correlating	   our	   continuous	   optimism	  
variable	  with	  each	  of	  four	  log-­‐transformed	  bias	  variables	  (left	  visual	  field	  harmless,	  left	  
visual	   field	   harmful,	   right	   visual	   field	   harmless,	   right	   visual	   field	   harmful).	   All	   four	  
correlations	  were	  positive,	  although	  only	  that	  between	  optimism	  and	  the	  right-­‐visual-­‐
field-­‐harmful	  bias	  variable	  was	  significant,	  Pearson	  r	  =	  .40,	  p	  =	  .023	  (uncorrected),	  n=32,	  
two-­‐tailed	   (see	   Figure	   1).	   Thus,	   using	   the	   full	   spectrum	   of	   optimism	   scores,	   a	   trend	  
emerged	   for	   more	   optimistic	   participants	   to	   be	   more	   conservative	   in	   detecting	  
illnesses,	  especially	  harmful	  illnesses	  presented	  to	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  
	  
______________________________	  
(Insert	  Fig.	  1	  about	  here)	  
                                                
3	  As	  the	  data	  violated	  assumptions	  of	  normality	  and	  homoscedasticity,	   this	  analysis	  was	  repeated	  after	  
applying	   log-­‐transformations	   that	   corrected	   for	   these	   problems	   (each	   score	   was	   subtracted	   from	   the	  
maximum	   score	   +	   1	   before	   taking	   the	   logarithm;	   resulting	   scores	   were	   reversed;	   Field,	   2013).	   Results	  







3.3	  Sensitivity	  Analyses	  
To	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  optimism	  and	  sensitivity	  of	  illness	  recognition	  
(taking	  into	  account	  illness	  harmfulness	  and	  visual	  field	  of	  presentation),	  we	  performed	  
a	   2	   (visual	   field)	   x	   2	   (harmfulness)	   x	   2	   (optimism)	   mixed-­‐design	   ANOVA	   on	   the	  
sensitivity	   scores	   (d')	   in	   the	   nosognosia	   task.	   This	   analysis	   revealed	   significant	   main	  
effects	  of	  visual	   field	   (F1,27	  =	  12.06,	  p	  =	   .002,	  ηp2	  =	   .309),	  harmfulness	   (F1,27	  =	  9.69,	  p	  =	  
.004,	  ηp2	  =	  .264)	  and	  optimism	  (F1,27	  =	  6.41,	  p	  =	  .017,	  ηp2	  =	  .192).	  Sensitivity	  was	  greater	  
when	  stimuli	  were	  presented	   in	  the	  right	  visual	  field	  (mean	  d'	  (SE)	  =	  1.67	  (.17))	  than	   in	  
the	   left	   visual	   field	   (1.02	   (.15)),	   and	   greater	   for	   harmful	   illnesses	   (1.49	   (.13))	   than	  
harmless	   illnesses	   (1.2	   (.14)).	  Contrary	  to	  our	  predictions,	  more	  optimistic	  participants	  
(1.67	   (.19))	   evinced	   a	   greater	   sensitivity	   than	   less	   optimistic	   participants	   (1.02	   (.18)).	  
None	  of	  the	  interactions	  were	  significant	  (all	  ps	  >	  .139).	  
	  
The	  right	  visual	  field	  variables	  in	  the	  above	  analysis	  violated	  assumptions	  of	  normality	  
and	   homoscedasticity.	   Log-­‐transformations	   corrected	   these	   problems,	   but	  
unfortunately	  when	  these	  transformations	  were	  applied	  to	  the	  left	  visual	  field	  variables	  
they	  caused	  those	  variables	  to	  become	  skewed.	  To	  check	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  above	  
analysis,	  we	  therefore	  ran	  follow-­‐up	  analyses	  for	  the	  left	  and	  right	  visual	  field	  variables	  
separately.	   A	   2	   (harmfulness)	   x	   2	   (optimism)	   mixed-­‐design	   ANOVA	   on	   the	  
(untransformed)	  sensitivity	  scores	  (d')	  for	  targets	  presented	  to	  the	  left	  visual	  field	  in	  the	  
nosognosia	  task	  revealed	  no	  main	  effects	  and	  no	  significant	   interaction	  (all	  ps	  >	  .085).	  
However,	  the	  same	  analysis	  performed	  on	  the	  log-­‐transformed	  sensitivity	  scores	  (d')	  for	  
targets	   presented	   to	   the	   right	   visual	   field	   revealed	   significant	   main	   effects	   of	  
harmfulness	  (F1,27	  =	  7.22,	  p	  =	  .012,	  ηp2	  =	  .211)	  and	  optimism	  (F1,27	  =	  4.33,	  p	  =	  .047,	  ηp2	  =	  
.138).	  Sensitivity	  was	  greater	  for	  harmful	  illnesses	  than	  for	  harmless	  illnesses,	  and	  more	  
optimistic	   participants	   were	   more	   sensitive	   than	   less	   optimistic	   participants.	   The	  
interaction	  between	  harmfulness	  and	  optimism	  was	  non-­‐significant	  (p	  =	  .152).	  
	  
To	   check	   whether	   the	   main	   effect	   of	   optimism	   reported	   above	   was	   specific	   to	   the	  
nosognosia	   task	   or	   was	   a	   lexical	   effect	   per	   se,	   we	   subsequently	   ran	   a	   2	   (task:	  
nosognosia,	   lexical	  decision;	  within-­‐subjects)	  x	  2	   (optimism)	  mixed-­‐design	  ANOVA	  on	  
the	  log-­‐transformed	  sensitivity	  scores	  (d')	  for	  targets	  presented	  to	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  
This	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  task	  (F1,27	  =	  24.24,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .473),	  
qualified	  by	  a	  significant	  task	  x	  optimism	  interaction	  (F1,27	  =	  6.50,	  p	  =	  .017,	  ηp2	  =	  .194)4.	  
Planned	  contrasts	  with	  a	  Bonferroni	  adjustment	  revealed	  that	  whereas	  more	  optimistic	  
participants	   were	  more	   sensitive	   than	   less	   optimistic	   participants	   on	   the	   nosognosia	  
task	  (p	  =	  .040),	  they	  were	  not	  more	  sensitive	  on	  the	  lexical	  decision	  task	  (p	  =	  .877).	  Thus	  
                                                
4	  Although	   the	   lexical	   decision	   task	  data	   violated	   the	   assumption	  of	   homoscedasticity	   (F1,27	   =	   4.73,	  p	   =	  
.039),	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   larger	   sample	   in	   this	  analysis	   (the	   low	  optimism	  group)	  had	   the	   larger	  variance	  




the	  greater	  sensitivity	  of	  optimistic	  participants	  was	  specific	  to	  the	  illness	  context.	  
	  
As	   per	   the	   bias	   analyses,	   we	   ran	   some	   final	   follow-­‐up	   analyses,	   correlating	   our	  
continuous	   optimism	   variable	   with	   each	   of	   four	   sensitivity	   variables	   (left	   visual	   field	  
harmless,	  left	  visual	  field	  harmful,	  right	  visual	  field	  harmless,	  right	  visual	  field	  harmful).	  
A	  log-­‐transformation	  was	  applied	  to	  the	  right	  (but	  not	  left)	  visual	  field	  variables	  before	  
running	  these	  analyses.	  All	  four	  correlations	  were	  positive,	  although	  only	  that	  between	  
optimism	   and	   the	   right-­‐visual-­‐field-­‐harmless	   sensitivity	   variable	   was	   significant,	  
Pearson	   r	   =	   .41,	   p	   =	   .020	   (uncorrected),	   n=32,	   two-­‐tailed	   (see	   Figure	   2).	   Thus,	   when	  
using	   the	   full	   spectrum	   of	   optimism	   scores,	   the	   sensitivity	   advantage	   for	   optimistic	  
participants	  appeared	  more	  pronounced	  when	  harmless	  illnesses	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  
right	  visual	  field.	  
	  
______________________________	  






The	   present	   study	   was	   designed	   to	   investigate	   the	   lateralized	   recognition	   of	   illness	  
words,	   an	   operational	   measure	   of	   nosognosia,	   in	   healthy	   participants	   varying	   in	  
optimism	  concerning	  future	  illness.	   In	  view	  of	  various	  connections	  between	  unrealistic	  
optimism	   and	   anosognosia,	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   we	   tested	   was	   that	   more	   optimistic	  
participants	   would	   adopt	   a	   more	   conservative	   response	   criterion	   when	   identifying	  
illnesses	   in	   our	   nosognosia	   task;	   especially	   harmful	   illnesses	   presented	   in	   the	   right	  
visual	   field.	  We	   found	  some	  qualified	  support	   for	   this	  hypothesis:	  although	  a	   factorial	  
analysis	  revealed	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  optimism	  or	  interactions	  between	  optimism	  and	  the	  
harmfulness	   or	   visual	   field	   variables,	   follow-­‐up	   analyses	   using	   the	   full	   spectrum	   of	  
optimism	   scores	   suggested	   that	   optimistic	   participants	   were	   more	   conservative	   in	  
detecting	  illnesses,	  especially	  harmful	  illnesses	  presented	  to	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  
	  
The	  second	  hypothesis	  we	  tested	  was	  that	  more	  optimistic	  participants	  would	  display	  
less	   sensitivity	   than	   less	   optimistic	   participants	   on	   our	   nosognosia	   task,	   being	  
particularly	   insensitive	  to	  harmful	   illnesses	  presented	  in	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  Contrary	  
to	   this	   prediction,	   however,	  we	   found	   that	   optimistic	   participants	  were	   actually	  more	  
sensitive.	   Although	   a	   factorial	   analysis	   revealed	   that,	   overall,	   sensitivity	   was	   greater	  
when	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  right	  visual	  field,	  optimism	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  this	  
variable.	   However,	   follow-­‐up	   analyses	   suggested	   that	   the	   sensitivity	   advantage	   of	  
optimistic	   participants	   was	   primarily	   observed	   when	   illnesses	   were	   presented	   to	   the	  




tasks	   (thus	   reflecting	   greater	   sensitivity	   to	   lexical	   items	   per	   se	   in	   the	   linguistically	  
dominant	  left	  hemisphere),	  but	  was	  specific	  to	  the	  nosognosia	  task.	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  optimistic	  participants	  evinced	  greater	  sensitivity	  on	  our	  nosognosia	  task	  
is	   surprising,	   but	   raises	   an	   intriguing	   possibility.	   ‘Positive	   illusions’	   like	   unrealistic	  
optimism	  are	  associated	  with	  psychological	  health	  (Taylor	  &	  Brown,	  1988;	  Strunk	  et	  al.,	  
2006;	  Sharot,	  2011),	  and	  McKay	  and	  Dennett	  (2009)	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  may	  be	  not	  
just	   psychologically	   but	   biologically	   adaptive.	   The	   notion	   that	   optimistic	   participants	  
are	   biased	   against	   acknowledging	   illnesses,	   especially	   harmful	   illnesses,	   is	   consistent	  
with	  this	  claim5.	  A	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  acknowledging	  the	  possibility	  of	  harmful	  illness	  to	  
oneself	  may	  be	  adaptive	   insofar	   as	   this	   constrains	  harmful	   recurrent	   activation	  of	   the	  
autonomic	  nervous	   system	  and	   the	  hypothalamic-­‐pituitary-­‐adreno-­‐cortical	   (HPA)	  axis	  
(see	  Taylor	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  2003).	  Meanwhile,	  avoiding	  acknowledgment	  of	  vulnerability	  or	  
frailty	  to	  others	  may	  enhance	  one’s	  apparent	  value	  as	  a	  social	  or	   reproductive	  partner	  
(Kurzban,	  2010;	  Trivers,	  2000;	  von	  Hippel	  &	  Trivers,	  2011).	  
	  
Blissful	   ignorance,	  however,	  has	   its	   limitations	  as	  an	  adaptive	  strategy.	  Any	  organism	  
needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  respond	  appropriately	  to	  threats	  of	  different	  kinds,	  taking	  evasive	  
action	   or	   precautionary	   measures	   as	   necessary.	   So	   this	   presents	   something	   of	   a	  
dilemma:	   how	   can	   one	   be	   both	   sufficiently	   cognizant	   of	   threatening	   information	   to	  
initiate	  relevant	  protective	  behaviours,	  yet	  sufficiently	  incognizant	  to	  avoid	  the	  dangers	  
of	  chronic	  cardiovascular	  and	  neuroendocrine	  stress	  responses?	  The	  answer	  may	  be	  to	  
compartmentalize:	   Some	   aspects	   of	   the	   mind	   have	   access	   to	   veridical	   information	  
about	   threats,	   and	   others	   (e.g.,	   conscious	   aspects)	   are	   relatively	   shielded	   from	   this	  
information.	  The	  aspects	  with	  access	  regulate	  the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  to	  the	  
conscious	   aspects	   (and	   thence	   to	   other	   individuals)	   by	   setting	   an	   appropriately	  
conservative	   response	   criterion.	   When	   action	   is	   judged	   necessary,	   the	   criterion	   is	  
lowered	  and	  the	  individual	  becomes	  consciously	  aware	  of	  the	  threat.	  The	  most	  adaptive	  
individuals	   (unrealistic	   optimists?)	   would	   be	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   potential	   threats,	   but	  
able	   to	   minimize	   the	   physiological	   costs	   of	   full	   awareness	   by	   setting	   an	   optimal	  
threshold	   for	   consciously	   ‘acknowledging’	   such	   threats.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   optimal	  
phenotype	  would	  be	  both	  sensitive	  and	  conservative.	  
	  
Although	   speculative,	   such	   ideas	   are	   influential	   in	   evolutionary	   psychology	   (e.g.,	  
Kurzban,	  2010;	  von	  Hippel	  &	  Trivers,	  2011).	  Continuing	   in	   this	  vein,	  we	  speculate	   that	  
whereas	  unrealistic	  optimism	  may	  represent	  a	  biologically	  adaptive	  strategy	  –	  optimal	  
nosognosia	   –	  anosognosia	  may	   involve	   severely	   impaired	   sensitivity,	   coupled	  with	  an	  
extreme,	   dysfunctional,	   conservative	   bias.	   Anosognosic	   patients	   thus	   have	   difficulty	  
detecting	  their	  impairments,	  and	  are	  extremely	  reluctant	  to	  acknowledge	  any	  evidence	  
of	   impairment	   they	   do	   acquire.	   In	   advancing	   these	   suggestions,	  we	   emphasize	   a	   key	  
                                                
5	   The	   fact	   that	   Sharot	   and	   colleagues	   (e.g.,	   Sharot	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   have	   identified	   biological	  mechanisms	  
underpinning	  unrealistic	  optimism	   is	  also	  consistent	  with	  this	  evolutionary	  claim	  (and	   inconsistent	  with	  




limitation	   of	   our	   study:	   our	   nosognosia	   paradigm,	   which	   involved	   the	   recognition	   of	  
illness	  words,	  may	  be	  a	  questionable	  proxy	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  actual	  signs	  of	  illness	  
in	  oneself.	  A	  complementary	  approach	  could	   involve	   judging	  the	  health	  of	  faces	  (e.g.,	  
Zaidel	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  where	  the	  stimulus	   faces	  could	  be	  morphed	  to	  a	  greater	  or	   lesser	  
degree	  with	  the	  participant’s	  own	  face.	   In	  any	  case,	  a	  century	  after	   the	  publication	  of	  
Babinski’s	  (1914)	  seminal	  paper	  on	  anosognosia,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  time	  has	  come	  to	  
develop	   a	   science	   of	   nosognosia,	   and	   we	   hope	   that	   our	   study	   is	   a	   first	   step	   in	   this	  
direction.	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Figure	   1:	   Scatterplot	   depicting	   the	   relationship	   between	   optimism	   and	   the	   log-­‐
transformed	  bias	  variable	  for	  harmful	  illnesses	  presented	  to	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  






Figure	   2:	   Scatterplot	   depicting	   the	   relationship	   between	   optimism	   and	   the	   log-­‐
transformed	  sensitivity	  variable	  for	  harmless	  illnesses	  presented	  to	  the	  right	  visual	  field.	  
	  
	  
	  
